Marxist materialist dialectics is the most profound, comprehensive and fruitful theory of motion and development. It is a summing up of the many centuries of our cognition of the world, a generalisation of the boundless data of social practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Materialist dialectics and philosophical materialism are inseparably connected. They are interwoven, being two aspects of the single philosophical system of Marxism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By the “art of dialectics” the ancient Greek philosophers meant the ability to establish the truth by means of disputation or discussion that revealed the difference in the views of the disputants. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, German idealist philosophers, particularly Hegel, understood by dialectics the development of thought through the contradictions disclosed in thought itself. Hegel gave a careful description of the basic forms of dialectical thought. However, in developing his dialectics he proceeded from an erroneous, idealist point of view, according to which dialectical development was ascribed solely to thought, the spirit, the idea, but not to nature. As Marx said, Hegel’s dialectics was “standing on its head”. To be correctly conceived, dialectics had to be put on its feet. This Marx and Engels did, creating materialist dialectics<\/em> and imparting a new content to the term “dialectics”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The founders of Marxism, proceeding from the principle of the material unity of the world, began to denote by dialectics the theory of universal connections, of the most general laws of development of all reality. “Dialectics” was thus transformed from Hegel’s idealist doctrine of the motion of thought into a materialist theory of the general laws of the development of being<\/em>. Thus, the dialectics of development of our notions (subjective dialectics) was found to be a reflection in scientific thought of the dialectics of development of being itself (objective dialectics).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The various branches of science study the forms of motion and laws of different spheres of reality. Dialectics is a special science. It devotes itself to the most general laws of all motion, change and development. The universality of its laws lies in the fact that they operate in nature and society, and that thought itself is governed by them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Marx and Engels saw in dialectics not only a scientific theory, but also a method of cognition<\/em> and a guide to action<\/em>. Knowledge of the genera laws of development makes it possible to analyse the past, to understand correctly what is taking place at present and to foresee the future. For this reason it is a method of approach<\/em> to research and to practical action based on its results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Throughout its history, dialectics has had to fight against metaphysics<\/em>, a method of thinking and a world outlook that is hostile to it, and that fight continues today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Marxist philosophical literature the word “metaphysics” is used in a different sense to that in pre-Marxian and modern bourgeois philosophical literature. In pre-Marxian literature this Greek word, or rather expression, denoted a special section<\/em> of philosophy, in which philosophers tried, and still try, to apprehend by purely speculative thought the allegedly immutable eternal essence of things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In criticising the unscientific, artificial systems of metaphysics, Marx and Engels used the word “metaphysics” to denote the method<\/em> of investigation and thought employed by the founders of these systems, which was contrary to the dialectical method, instead of using it to denote a section of philosophy or speculative cognition. At present the term is used in Marxist philosophy almost exclusively in the sense given it by Marx and Engels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The basic defect of metaphysics is its one-sided, limited, inflexible outlook upon the world\u2014its tendency to exaggerate and make absolute individual aspects of phenomena and to ignore other, no less important aspects. The metaphysician, for example, discerns the relative stability, the definiteness of a thing, but does not notice its change and development. He concentrates his attention on the features that distinguish a particular phenomenon from all others, but he is incapable of discerning its many-sided relations and profound connections with other things and phenomena. He recognises only final answers to all questions confronting science, and does not understand that reality itself is in a state of development and that a scientific proposition possesses meaning only within definite bounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The metaphysical method is more or less adequate for day-to-day usage and the lower phases of scientific development, but inevitably breaks down when the attempt is made to use it for explaining complex processes of development. Natural science and socio-political affairs reveal at each step the inadequacy of metaphysics and the need to replace it by dialectics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In spite of this, metaphysics has not been discarded as obsolete even today, whether in philosophy or the special sciences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n How to explain the survival of metaphysics? There was a time when scientific thought was in the main not dialectical, but metaphysical. The metaphysical mode of thought as a method of science took final shape and became widespread in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the time of the emergence of modern science. At that time, natural science was engaged mostly in collecting information about nature and its phenomena into distinct classes. In order to describe any particular thing it had to be isolated from the totality of other things, and examined separately. This approach gave rise to the custom of studying things and phenomena in isolation, outside their universal connection. This prevented people from seeing the development of things, their origin from other, different things. It was thus that the metaphysical mode of thought came into being, viewing things in isolation from one another and ignoring their development. Metaphysics reigned supreme in man’s consciousness for a long time and became a tradition of scientific thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nothing can justify the application of the metaphysical method in our time. It is a backward method, a backward world outlook, and has a very adverse effect on scientific cognition and socio-political affairs, because it leads easily to gross errors and misconceptions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A second reason why metaphysics has survived is the hostile attitude which the ideologists of the bourgeoisie have long displayed toward materialist dialectics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors,” wrote Marx, “because it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in essence critical and revolutionary.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not surprising that, under the political and ideological influence of reaction, many scientists and philosophers in the capitalist countries are to this day afraid of dialectics, do not know of it, and do not study it, regard it with prejudice and take their cue from metaphysics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Marxist materialist dialectics provides a reliable weapon against metaphysics, for a scientific examination of all the phenomena of developing reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The world that surrounds man is the scene of a prodigious diversity of phenomena. The simplest observations show that between these phenomena there are definite and more or less stable connections. A definite permanence, a regularity, is found in the world. Day follows night, winter is followed by spring. An oak, and not a pine or birch, grows out of an acorn. A chrysalis becomes a butterfly, and never becomes a caterpillar again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even in distant antiquity people came to realise that the things and phenomena of the surrounding world were bound up with one another and that there was a natural necessary connection between them, independent of man’s consciousness and volition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n True, the understanding of this connection was for long impeded by superstitious and religious notions, according to which natural phenomena might be produced by supernatural forces or Gods capable of violating the natural connection of things. However, science and materialist philosophy insisted that miracles and supernatural occurrences did not and could not exist, and that only the natural connection of things and phenomena existed in the world. Gradually, this truth penetrated deeply into the human mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the course of the scientific and philosophical cognition of the world, many forms and manifestations of the universal connection of phenomena were discovered, and concepts (categories) arose to express these, such as causality, interaction, necessity, law, accident, essence and appearance, possibility and reality, form and content. This section of Chapter 2 deals chiefly with categories directly association with the conception of the necessary<\/em> character of universal connections and the determination of phenomena, i.e., the principle of determinism, which is the corner-stone of any genuinely scientific explanation of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most familiar form of connection, observed everywhere and always, is the connection of cause and effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The cause of a phenomenon usually denotes that which brought about its existence. The phenomenon produces is called the effect or consequence. The wind, for example, is the cause of the movement of a sailing vessel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is a definite sequence in time between cause and effect. The cause comes first, and is followed by the effect. But “subsequent” by no means necessarily means “consequent”. For example, day always follows night, and night follows day, but day is not the cause of night and night is not the cause of day. It is well known that the cause of the alternation of day and night is the rotation of the earth about its axis, resulting in the illumination first of one side and then of the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Effect is necessarily connected with cause. If a cause exists, the effect will inevitably follow, provided nothing interferes with it. If you press the trigger of a loaded rifle, a discharge is bound to occur. But we known that sometimes no discharge occurs. Does this mean that the causal connection has lost its necessary character? No, it only means that some other cause has prevented the discharge. Possibly, the spring of the trigger had weakened, or the gunpowder was moist, or the cartridge spoilt, etc. By investigating all the circumstances we can determine the cause which prevented the expected phenomenon from occurring. Thus, the break in the causal connection is here really only a seeming one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In order that a cause should produce an action, certain conditions<\/em> are always required. The conditions are those phenomena which are necessary for the occurrence of a given event, but do not bring it about of themselves. For example, various conditions are necessary in order that an airplane may rise into the air, such as a suitable airfield, favourable weather conditions, etc. But these conditions of themselves are, of course, insufficient for the take-off, which requires the operation of the plane’s motors as an immediate cause.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Quite often, particularly in complication cases, cause is easily confused with the occasion<\/em>. Such confusion is due to a superficial view of things and an inability to discern between the true, deep-lying causes of phenomena. The occasion of itself cannot give rise to any phenomenon, but it acts as an impulse which brings the actual cause into operation. For example, the assassination in Sarajevo of the Austrian crown prince, Franz-Ferdinand, was the occasion for the First World War. Yet we know that the war was not caused by this assassination, but by the increasingly bitter rivalry of the imperialist powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To grasp events correctly in practical affairs, in politics, and to separate the essential from the non-essential, it is especially important to be able to distinguish actual causes from conditions and occasions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Causal connection is universal in character and applies to all the phenomena of nature and society, whether simple or complex, whether known or unknown to science. Causeless phenomena do not and cannot exist. Every phenomenon necessarily has a cause.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is the cardinal purpose of science to determine causal connections. To explain a phenomenon, one must find its cause. By investigating and cognising the world, science penetrates to the roots of phenomena\u2014from the surface of events to their immediate, direct causes, and from these to more profound, general and essential causes. Ignorance of the true cause of a phenomenon not only makes it impossible for man consciously to produce or prevent it; it tends to give rise to unscientific and fantastic notions, superstitions, and mystical, religious explanations of nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is why the problem of causality has long been the subject of bitter controversy between materialism and idealism. Idealist philosophers have often either totally denied the objective nature of causal connection or sought its source not in nature, but in some spiritual principle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the opinion of David Hume, the eighteenth-century English philosopher, experience does not reveal the necessary connection of phenomena. That is why, he claimed, we can only say that one phenomenon follows another, but are not justified in saying that one phenomenon produces another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Immanuel Kant understood that there could be no science, unless the obligatory nature of causal connection was recognised. But, like Hume, he assumed that there was no such connection in observable phenomena. Kant sought the source of causality and necessity in the human mind, whose peculiar design allegedly imparts a causal connection to the phenomena we perceive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many modern idealists aver that there is neither cause nor effect in nature and that, as L. Wittgenstein put it, “the belief in the causal nexus is superstition<\/em>“.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These idealist views are conclusively refuted by the whole history of science. The raison d’\u00eatre<\/em> of natural and social sciences is concerned principally with discovering and studying the causes of phenomena. But the most convincing proof of the objective character of causal connection is provided by man’s practical productive activities. By discovering causal dependencies in nature and then making practical use of this knowledge, people produce the effects they require and arrive at desired results. “In this way<\/em>, by the activity of human beings<\/em>,” Engels wrote, “the idea of causality<\/em> becomes established, the idea that one motion is the cause <\/em>of another.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n Idealism and religion oppose the materialist causal theory with the doctrine of ends, or so-called teleology<\/em> (derived from the Greek “telos<\/em>“\u2014purpose). To the causal explanation which replies to the question why a natural phenomenon has occurred, teleology counterposes the conjecture for what ends<\/em> it has occurred. According to the teleological viewpoint, the existence, design and development of a thing are determined by the purpose, or “final cause”, for which it is meant. Teleology is an extremely convenient doctrine for religion and idealist philosophy, because it leads inevitably to the conclusion that a supreme reason (God) exists and achieves its ends in nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As proof of their views, supporters of teleology usually point to the purposive structure of organisms (e.g., the protective colouring of animals). Marxist dialectics does not deny purposiveness in the anatomical structure and activity of living organisms. But it declares that this has its basis in objective causes. The mechanism by which these causes operate was revealed by Darwin’s theory. Alteration of plants and animals arises through their interaction with changed conditions of life. If these alterations prove beneficial to the organism, i.e., if they help it to adapt itself to the environment and survive, they are preserved through natural selection, become hereditary, pass from one generation to another, producing that purposive structure of the organism, that adaptation to the environment, which so often strikes the imagination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The theoretical and practical significance of the causal connection of phenomena is tremendous. But it does not exhaust the multiformity of relations in the objective world. Lenin wrote that “causality … is but a small particle of the universal connection” and that “human conception of cause and effect always what simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of a single world process.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n This means that the interconnection of phenomena in nature and society is more extensive and complex than the connection expressed by the relation of cause to effect. In particular, cause and effect are subordinate to the broader relation of interaction<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nature constitutes a single whole, all parts of which are interconnected in one way or another. In this universal interconnection, any phenomenon, itself the effect of some cause, also acts as a cause in some other connection, giving rise to new effects. The evaporation of water in the seas and rivers owing to the action of the sun’s rays, for example, leads to the formation of clouds. These, in turn, produce rain, which moistens the soil and feeds the brooks and streams.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Interaction is also observed in the influence exerted upon each other by cause and effect within one and the same process; in this sense, the two change places\u2014the cause becoming the effect, and vice versa. The continuous thermonuclear reaction in the sun is an example of such interaction, for the process in which hydrogen atoms are converted into helium atoms creates a high temperature (of the order of millions of degrees) which, in turn, necessarily causes the synthesis of helium atoms from hydrogen atoms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We often observe interaction also when studying social affairs. For example, a greater popular demand for a commodity stimulates greater production of it. In turn, the growth of production produces increased demand. Cause and effect change places. Demand affects production, and production affects demand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hence, cause and effect should not be viewed metaphysically as ossified, unconnected, absolute opposites. They should be viewed dialectically as interconnected, interconvertible, “fluid” conceptions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, it is not enough to demonstrate the interaction of different factors or different phenomena. We still have to find out which side is the determining one in this interaction. It is only when we have discovered this that we can understand correctly the sources of the process, appraise the forces involved in it, and see the main line, the direction of development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And to give a proper idea of the interaction between growth of demand and growth of production in the example cited above, it should be stressed that growth of production is the determining factor in this interaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By recognising that all phenomena are necessarily subject to causality, we recognise the existence of necessity. The inception and development of phenomena that follow from the most essential relations lying at the root of a process are called necessary. Necessary development is the development that cannot fail to take place under the given conditions. For example, in the history of the organic world less adapted organisms are necessarily replaced by those more adapted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Necessity in nature and society is most completely revealed in laws. Recognising necessity in the origin and development of phenomena involves recognising that they are subject to certain regularities that exist independently of man’s will or desire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Each law is a manifestation of the necessity that governs phenomena. For example, a body raised above the surface of the earth will necessarily fall back to earth, provided it is not held up by some force acting in the opposite direction. This example illustrates the law of gravitation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is a law? A law is a profound, essential, stable and repeated connection or dependence of phenomena or of different sides of one and the same phenomenon. The law of Archimedes, for example, establishes a stable connection between the weight of a fluid or gas displaced by a body immersed in it and the magnitude of the “upward thrust” exerted upon the body by the fluid or gas. Laws may be less general, operating in a limited field (e.g., Ohm’s law), or more general, applying to a very wide field (e.g., the law of conservation of energy). Some laws establish the prices quantitative dependence of phenomena and may be expressed mathematically (e.g., the laws of mechanics). Other laws do not lend themselves to precise mathematical formulation (e.g., the law of natural selection). But all laws express the objective, necessary connection of phenomena.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Knowledge of the laws of objective reality makes possible a deeper understanding of the causes of events and therefore constitutes a reliable basis for man’s purposeful activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, no law can embrace all aspects of a phenomenon. It expresses only the latter’s most essential features.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To discover the law governing any particular set of phenomena, it is necessary to leave out of account all subsidiary circumstances and to isolate in its pure form the essential, decisive connection between the phenomena. Science does this both by specially contrived experiments and by logical isolation, or abstraction, of the essential aspects of the phenomena. The law of freely falling bodies (the law of Galileo), for example, does not take the resistance of the air into account and establishes that all bodies fall with the same acceleration. But in the earth’s atmosphere, a body may fall swiftly, like a stone, or descend slowly, like a dry leaf, or may even rise for a time, like the seeds of the dandelion or other plants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Galileo’s law holds good in all these cases. but this law alone is insufficient to explain fully the falling of a body in specific conditions. Such an explanation requires knowledge not only of the law, but of the circumstances in which it operates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Among the diverse phenomena of nature and society are some that do not necessarily follow from the law-governed development of a given thing or a given series of events and which may or may not occur, may happen in one way, or in another way. These are accidental phenomena.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the farmer’s crop is damaged by hail, for example, this is accidental in relation to his labour and the laws governing the growth of plants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem of accident has been the subject of much dispute in science. The perfectly correct principle that causality holds good for all phenomena in nature and human society has led many scientists and philosophers to draw the incorrect conclusion that only necessity exists in the world, and that no phenomena are accidental. Accident, from their point of view, is a subjective concept which we use to denote effects whose cause we do not know.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This viewpoint is entirely wrong, because it makes the two different conceptions\u2014necessity and causality\u2014identical. It is true that here are no causeless phenomena in the world, and that accidental phenomena are causally determined. But this does not make accidental phenomena necessary. Take the following example. A train jumps the rails and is wrecked. We may find that the cause of the wreck was, for example, loosened rails which the linesman had overlooked. Yet the disaster was an accident, not a necessity. Why? Because it was brought about by a circumstance not necessarily connected with the laws of motion of railway traffic, since it is technically quite possible to provide conditions in which such disasters will not occur.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The denial of objective accidentality leads to conclusions that are harmful from the scientific and practical points of view.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One who regards everything as necessary will be incapable of discriminating between the essential and the non-essential, between the necessary and the accidental. As Engels put it, necessity itself would then be reduced to the level of accident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A correct understanding of the concepts of necessity and accident involves seeing not only the difference between them, but also their connection. Necessity makes its way through a maze of accidents. The dialectics of necessity and accident consists in the fact that accident appears as a form in which necessity manifests itself, and is supplementary to necessity. Therefore, accident has its place also within a necessary process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here is an example. In winter in northern latitudes the weather becomes cold and snow falls. That is a necessity. But on what particular day the temperature drops below zero and snow falls, how cold it is, how much snow falls, etc.\u2014all that is accidental. Yet there is necessity in these accidents, because both cold and snow are necessary signs of winter in that region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the earlier example of the derailed train, the disaster was an accident. But if the railway is badly organised, if discipline is poor, and the personnel inefficient, then disasters will become a necessary result of the unsatisfactory working of the railway, instead of a rare accident. Of course, in that case too, the specific circumstances of a disaster, and its time and place, will still be more or less accidental.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Further, accidents may influence the development of a necessary process, accelerating or retarding it. Frequently, accidents enter so considerably into the development of a necessary process that they become necessity. Thus, according to Darwin’s theory, minute accidental changes in an organism which are beneficial to it become established through heredity and strengthened in the process of evolution, resulting in a change in the species. Accidental differences thus become necessary characteristics of a new species.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The above is evidence that necessity and accident are not absolutely separate from each other. They interact and pass into one another in the process of development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It follows from this connection of accident and necessity that accidental phenomena are also governed by certain laws, which may be studied and become known.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, it has been statistically established that in the United States the average expectation of life is higher among whites than among Negroes. This regularity does not mean, however, that every white man lives longer than every Negro. Some whites die young, while some Negroes live to a ripe old age. But the above regularity holds good on the average, as a whole, and reflects the adverse situation of the Negroes in the U.S.A., racial discrimination, inferior living conditions, lower wages, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The regularities governing accidental phenomena have been generalised in a number of scientific theories, and particularly in the mathematical theory of probability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The principle of determinism<\/em>, always upheld by the materialists, consists in the recognition of the objective character of universal connection, the causative determination of phenomena, the rule of necessity and regularity in nature and society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Determinism is the basic principle of all genuinely scientific thinking, since it is only by knowing the causes of phenomena that their origin can be scientifically explained, and only by knowing the law governing phenomena that their further development can be predicted. However, the conception of determinism underwent a change in the course of the development of science. Natural science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which confined itself to studying the “macrocosm”, i.e., the world of relatively large bodies and their, and based itself chiefly on Newton’s mechanics, was dominated by mechanical determinism<\/em>. Its distinguishing feature, which was also its defect, was that it made every cause a mechanical one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This viewpoint was justified and confirmed by practice in the study of the motion and mechanical interaction of celestial bodies and also of macroscopic terrestrial bodies and parts of bodies. It was by the method of mechanical determinism that scientists could predict the visible positions of the sun and planets and could calculate how to construct machines and engineering works.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, all attempts to apply the principle of mechanical determinism in studying more complex phenomena proved a failure. Biological phenomena, physiological and mental processes, and the social activities of people, could not be explained merely by mechanical determinism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second extremely important defect of mechanical determinism was that it did not recognise the objectivity of accidental phenomena. Its adherents rejected accident as being identical with causelessness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The inadequacy of mechanical determinism became particularly evident when the progress of science and technology led to cognition of the microcosm and the properties of the so-called elementary particles, i.e., the minutest and simplest particles known to modern science (electrons, positrons, mesons, etc.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accident plays an extremely important part in the microcosm, and for processes occurring in it quantum mechanics takes into account both necessity and accident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Discoveries in regard to the microcosm and the development of quantum mechanics were in themselves a formidable achievement of science and involved a dialectical conception of the world. It was shown that the properties and relations of material bodies, and of their particles, were not as homogeneous and uniform as the old physics had assumed, and that matter was inexhaustible in its diversity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, physical discoveries also served for drawing idealistic conclusions, which have been upheld not only by idealist philosophers, but also by some prominent scientists in the capitalist countries who have been influenced by religion and idealism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The school of “indeterminism” made its appearance in modern physics and the philosophy of natural science. Its representatives reject the very principle of objectively necessary connection. They proceed from the erroneous assumption that determinism is only possible in its old mechanical form, which disregards accident, and on the basis of the scientifically proved inadequacy of this mechanical determinism they conclude that any form of determinism is untenable. Thus, voluntarily or involuntarily, they allow superstition and belief in miracles to have a place in science. Some of them go so far as to attribute “free will” to the electron. From their point of view, the progress of science itself has made it possible to reconcile and combine science with idealism and religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In reality, however, modern physics has not refuted determinism, but has revealed that in the microcosm it operates in a special way. Study of the laws governing the phenomena of the microcosm is the main subject of quantum mechanics, which is being successfully applied in the calculations of scientists and engineers. And this is testimony that in this field, too, we are dealing with the objectively necessary conditions and determination inherent in all the phenomena of reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first thing to do in investigating the various phenomena of reality is to distinguish the particular phenomenon under study from all others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The totality of the essential features that make a particular thing or phenomenon what it is and distinguish it from others, is called its quality<\/em>. The philosophical concept of quality differs from the notion of it in everyday life, where it is associated with value. In that sense people speak of the good or bad quality of, for instance, food, manufactured articles or artistic productions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The philosophical concept of quality does not contain any element of value. It is only a concept that denotes the inseparable distinguishing features, the inner structure, constituting the definiteness of a phenomenon and without which it ceases to be what it is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It should be borne in mind, of course, that no quality exists by itself. There are only things or phenomena which are characterised by qualitative definiteness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But inside things, or totalities of them possessing a distinct qualitative definiteness, there may also be more or less significant qualitative differences. In the animal world, for example, vertebrates differ qualitatively from arthropoda. But within the general subtype of vertebrates there are qualitative differences between mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, and amphibia. Furthermore, there are, in turn, qualitative differences among mammals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The demarcation and identification of the features and distinctions that constitute the quality of a phenomenon are only the beginning of cognition. Besides quality, each thing has also a quantitative aspect, marked by the special quantitative <\/em>characteristics in which its quality exists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The quantitative definiteness of a thing may refer to its external features. For example, a thing may be big or small. But it may also characterise the internal nature of a thing. Thus, every metal has its own heat conductivity, its own coefficient of expansion, and every liquid has its own heat capacity, its own boiling-point and freezing-point, while every gas has its own temperature of liquefaction, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The quantitative characteristics of qualitatively different materials and processes are particularly important in technology. Modern industry relies on them at every step.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was only when quantitative measurements relating to the phenomena were combined with qualitative descriptions that natural science achieved appreciable progress. Observations of the stars and of the visible movements of the planets were begun very long ago. But astronomy did not develop as a science until the first measurements were made of the visible positions of the stars in the sky and of the angular distances between them, etc. In other fields of science as well, the progress of scientific knowledge was bound up with the development of measuring and computing devices, the development of methods of measurement, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not surprising, therefore, that the founders of the science of modern times, such as Galileo, regarded analysis of the quantitative relations and properties of phenomena as the main task of natural science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the scientists of that time went to extremes. They endeavoured to reduce all “qualities” to “quantities” that corresponded to them, and failed to see the basic qualitative differences behind the quantitative differences of phenomena.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The purely quantitative approach to natural phenomena led to the mechanism typical of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century science, i.e., the conviction that mathematics and mechanics provided an adequate basis for cognition of the whole world, and that any phenomenon could be understood if explained by the laws of mechanics. According to the theory of Ren\u00e9 Descartes, for example, animals were simply complex machines whose activities were wholly explicable by means of mechanical causes. And La Mettrie, the French eighteenth-century materialist, went so far as to argue in his essay, Man-Machine<\/em>, that not only animals, but men as well, were nothing more than machines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The mechanistic view of nature was progressive for its time, because it required a strictly scientific approach to all natural phenomena and rejected all idealist and theological “explanations”. But it was soon discovered that the quantitative approach alone was insufficient and that cognition of objects and phenomena required the discovery of their peculiarities, their specific distinguishing features. The external world is full of diverse qualities and can only be understood and explained if the qualitative as well as the quantitative aspects of all phenomena and processes are taken into account. The problem, therefore, is not one of simply reducing the quality of a phenomenon to its quantity, but of understanding what relation there is between the quantitative <\/em>definiteness of a phenomenon and its qualitative <\/em>definiteness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The development of science demonstrated that there are quantitative relations common to many qualitatively different objects and processes. For example, the mathematical formulae of the wave theory are applicable to phenomena of various physical types\u2014mechanical vibration, electro-magnetic oscillation, thermal fluctuation, and others. This is possible because all these phenomena objectively possess certain common features, common regularities, which may be quantitatively expressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the contemporary stage of the development of science, mathematics, which deals with quantitative relations, is being increasingly applied to scientific investigation in a number of qualitatively different fields of reality and in technology. This is unquestionably a sign of progress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the very possibility of applying a particular quantitative relation to qualitatively different processes presupposes a concrete study of all the qualitative peculiarities of each of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One-sided emphasis of either the quantitative or the qualitative aspect indicates a metaphysical approach. Metaphysics is blind to the inherently necessary connection between quantity and quality. Dialectical thought, on the other hand, achieved an important advance by establishing that the quantitative definiteness and the qualitative definiteness of things are not entirely external and indifferent opposites, but that there is a profound dialectical connection between them. In its most general form, this connection consists in the fact that quantitative changes of a thing inevitably bring about a change in its quality<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We are surrounded on all sides by examples of such conversions of quantitative changes into qualitative ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, a change in the length of electromagnetic waves is attended by the marked qualitative differences shown by radio waves, infra-red radiation, the spectrum of visible radiation, ultra-violet waves, X-rays and, last but not least, so-called gamma rays.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Innumerable qualitative changes brought about by quantitative changes can be observed in chemistry. Take the synthetic substances (rubber, plastics, synthetic fibres), which are so prominent in industry and everyday use. Their molecules, marked by their great size, are formed by the combination of many small molecules of identical composition. This combination of small molecules (monomers) into large ones (polymers) results in qualitative changes, for polymers have many remarkable properties that monomers lack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Quantitative modifications proceed more or less gradually and are often scarcely noticeable. In the beginning they do not modify the qualitative definiteness of a thing to any substantial extent. Subsequently, however, they accumulate and finally lead to a radical qualitative modification. “Quantity,” it is said, “passes into quality.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, steel retains its solidity when heated. but when its temperature reaches the critical point the metal ceases to be a solid and becomes a liquid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dialectical transition of quantity into quality is of particularly great importance for understanding the process of development, because it explains the emergency of new quality, without which there is no development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, in the early stages of social development there was a natural economy, with each community producing all it needed for its own existence. Subsequently, as production increased, exchange of commodities began. It became more frequent, grew quantitatively, and this led finally to very substantive qualitative changes in the economic life of society. Natural economy was replaced by commodity economy, in which people produced things for exchange rather than their own consumption, and obtained the things they needed by means of exchange.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If a new quality arises from quantitative changes, it will have a new quantitative definiteness. This is the “passage of quality into quantity”. Thus, a qualitatively new model of a machine results in a higher productivity of labour. Socialist economy, qualitatively different from capitalist economy, develops at a higher rate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The passage of quantitative changes into radical qualitative changes, and vice versa, constitutes the universal dialectical law of development<\/em>. It operates in all the processes of nature, society and thought\u2014in all spheres where the old is replaced by the new.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The transition of a thing, through the accumulation of quantitative modifications, from one qualitative state to a different, new state, is a leap<\/em> in development. The leap is a break in the gradualness of the quantitative change of a thing. it is the transition to a new quality and signalises a sharp turn, a radical change in development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, the emergency of man was a leap\u2014a radical turning-point in the development of the organic world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Leaps, transitions from one quality to another, are relatively rapid. However, the slowness of the quantitative modifications and the rapidity of the qualitative change are relative. The leaps are rapid in comparison<\/em> with the preceding periods of gradual accumulation of quantitative modifications. This rapidity varies, depending upon the nature of the object and the conditions in which the leap occurs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The term evolution<\/em> is used to denote quantitative changes both in nature and in society. Sometimes it is used not only to denote gradual quantitative changes, but, in a broader sense, to denote development in general, which embraces both quantitative and qualitative changes. We often describe modern Darwinism as a theory of the evolution of the organic world, implying that this evolution cover both qualitative and quantitative changes. Leap-like qualitative changes in social life are designated by the concept of revolution<\/em>. By a revolution in the development of society is meant above all qualitative changes in the social system. But revolutions also occur in other fields of social life\u2014in technology, production, science and culture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is an internal necessary connection between evolution and revolution. The evolutionary development of society is inevitably consummated by leap-like qualitative transformations, by revolutions. Revolutionary changes of quality are the starting-point of a new period of evolutionary changes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The doctrine of materialist dialectics on the passage of quantitative into qualitative changes is an important weapon in the struggle against Right-wing and “Left-wing” opportunists. It helps to reveal the fallacy of reformism, which denies the necessity of socialist revolution and asserts that the transition to socialism can be effected through reforms\u2014the gradual “growing” of capitalism into socialism. On the other hand, dialectics demonstrates the complete theoretical untenability of all ultra-Leftist trends, which ignore the natural development of events and under-estimate the importance of every-day work among the masses, of preparing them for revolution, of building up the revolutionary forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Marx and Engels created materialist dialectics in the course of combating the metaphysical view of nature, which denied development. Since then the situation has changed. In the second half of the nineteenth century the idea of development spread far and wide (mainly owing to Darwin’s theory). However, the metaphysical point of view did not disappear. It took the shape of a distorted, one-sided conception of development itself. At present, the struggle of dialectics against metaphysics centres chiefly round the question of how to understand development, and not of whether there is development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the varieties of the metaphysical conception of development consists in the contention that nature develops exclusively by small, gradual, continuous quantitative changes, by way of evolution, and that it does not admit of leaps, of sharp qualitative changes. “Nature does not make leaps,” say the adherents of that view. Since they see nothing in development besides evolution, they are called “trite evolutionists”. It was Herbert Spencer, the nineteenth century English philosopher and sociologist, who founded the school of “trite evolutionism”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to Spencer, development takes place smoothly, without the slightest interruption of its gradualness, solely through the quantitative addition of elements, the stages of the evolutionary process not differing qualitatively, but only quantitatively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Spencer’s theory of “trite evolutionism” exercised a considerable influence on many positivist trends in philosophy and natural science. It was adopted by many bourgeois and revisionist theorists and used in the struggle against Marxist materialist dialectics, against the teaching of Marx and Engels on proletarian revolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The obvious fallacy of “trite evolutionism” and its variance with the facts led to the emergence of another notion of development, which was externally its very opposite, but was just as one-sided and metaphysical. This is the so-called theory of “creative evolution”, which became fashionable in the twentieth century.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The adherents of “trite evolutionism” saw in development only quantitative changes, while the adherents of “creative evolution” saw in it nothing but qualitative changes. They stressed that development was “creative”, and that it consisted in the appearance of new forms. But they did not see the obligatory connection between these qualitative changes and the preceding quantitative modifications. They asserted that the appearance of the new in the process of development could not be explained by the operations of natural causes and that the only possible explanation was a mysterious “creative force” of a spiritual kind, which directed development and engendered new forms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus this new theory of “creative evolution” leads to the old idea of God, which clearly exposes its anti-scientific character.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The metaphysical conception of development is opposed by the genuinely scientific dialectical conception which recognises both gradual changes and leap-like qualitative ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We saw that the process of development is the passage of an old quality into a new quality at a definite stage of quantitative modification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But what is the motive force, the source, of all development? A most important task of materialist dialectics is to answer that question. The starting-point for its answer is the contradictory nature of reality itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even in ancient times people noticed that opposed properties, forces and tendencies were clearly evident and played a very important part in the infinite diversity of the external world. They noticed, furthermore, that opposites not only coexisted side by side, but that they were interconnected and that they arose in one and the same object or phenomenon, that they constituted different sides of a single thing or process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many philosophers of ancient China, India, Greece and other countries held that the origin and existence of things could only be explained by understanding what opposites went to form them. In those times, hot and cold, dry and moist, empty and full, being and non-being, etc., were thought to be such opposites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The notion that the collision of opposites was the motive force in change was expressed already in antiquity. Thus, the ancient Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, taught that “everything happens through struggle”, that struggle is the source\u2014the “father”\u2014of all things. The ancient dialecticians also noticed that opposites are not something ossified and immutable, that they are relative, that they differ from each other only in a certain sense, and that in certain circumstances one passes into the other, and vice versa. These were essentially brilliant conjectures, although often expressed in a na\u00efve form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In feudal society, where the Church persecuted all independent study of nature, the idea of unity and struggle of opposites faded into oblivion. At the time of the emergence of capitalist society the question of opposites again attracted attention. Such outstanding thinkers as N. Kuzansky (15th century) and Giordano Bruno (16th century) taught that where the ordinary mind sees only irreconcilable opposites (the infinite and the finite, the crooked and the straight, etc.), a more profound mind detects the unity or the “coincidence of opposites”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mechanistic natural science, which prevailed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, did not favour the development of dialectics and, in particular, the doctrine of opposites. However, even at that time penetrating thinkers who observed the events and relations of the pre-revolutionary epoch, which was full of acute conflicts and collisions, voiced far-reaching thoughts about the significance of opposites in social life and history. (See, for example, Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew<\/em> or Rousseau’s The Origin and the Reasons of Inequality<\/em>.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n The significance of opposites attracted the attention of a number of German philosophers at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, while with Hegel it became one of the basic principles of his philosophy. Hegel conceived the process of development as movement from a unity through the disclosure of opposites into a new unity, as the passing of a thing or phenomenon into its opposite. He called the combination of opposite aspects in a phenomenon its “contradiction”. But being an idealist, he regarded the contradictions of reality as contradictions in the logical development of the absolute idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The founders of Marxism, who remodelled Hegel’s dialectics materialistically, preserved the term “contradiction”, but gave it a different, materialist meaning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By a dialectical contradiction Marxism understands the presence in a phenomenon or process of opposite, mutually exclusive aspects which, at the same time, presuppose each other and within the framework of the given phenomenon exist only in mutual connection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the ancient dialecticians, the doctrine of opposites and their “coincidence” was no more than a conjecture made on the basis of the immediate perception of reality, and thinking about it. For Marxist dialectics it is a conclusion from the facts accumulated by science as the result of investigating all fields of reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, the study of the phenomena of nature, social relations or man’s mental activity reveals contradictions, i.e., conflicts of opposed aspects or tendencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It stands to reason that so long as we examine a thing at rest, in a static state, we see in it merely different properties and features and may overlook the “struggle” of opposites and, consequently, fail to see any contradictions. But as soon as we try to follow the movement, the modification, the development of a thing, we instantly discover the existence in it of opposed aspects and processes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, when examining a prepared slide of a plant or animal cell under the microscope, we see no more than its structure, i.e., the cell wall, the nucleus, the protoplasm, etc. But if we observe a living<\/em> cell, we shall see taking place in it the opposed processes of assimilation and dissimilation, the growth and dying away of its component parts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Opposites and contradictions are encountered in all fields of science. Mathematics deals with the opposed operations of addition and subtraction, differentiation and integration; mechanics with action and reaction, attraction and repulsion; physics with positive and negative electric charges; chemistry with the combination and dissociation of atoms; the physiology of the nervous system with excitation and inhibition in the cerebral cortex; and social science with the class struggle and many other opposites and, consequently, contradictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Human thought and cognition are also governed by the principle of dialectical contradiction. In the process of cognition, for example, we observe continuous conflicts of opposite views, contradictions between old theories and new facts, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The concept of contradiction is of crucial importance in analysing the process of development<\/em>. In nature, social life and human thought, development proceeds in such a way that opposite, mutually exclusive sides or tendencies reveal themselves in an object; they enter into a “struggle”, which culminates in the destruction of the old forms and the emergence of new ones. Such is the law of development. “Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites,” wrote Lenin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It stands to reason that this proposition must not be understood too simply. The struggle<\/em> of opposites in the direct, literal sense of the word occurs chiefly in human society. It is by no means always possible to speak of struggle in its literal sense as regards the organic world. And as regards inorganic nature the term is to be understood still less literally. That is why Lenin puts the term in quotation marks. These qualifications are necessary for a correct idea of the struggle of opposites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The division of a unity into opposites and the mutual counteraction or “struggle” of these opposites is the most fundamental and universal law of dialectics. As Lenin emphasises, the division of unity and the cognition of its contradictory parts is one of the most fundamental features of dialectics, it is indeed “the essence<\/em> of dialectics”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n All development, whether the evolution of the stars, the growth of a plant, the life of a man or the history of society, is contradictory in its essence. In fact, development in its most general sense signifies that at any given moment a thing retains its identity and at the same time ceases to retain it. Its definiteness remains, but at the same time it changes and becomes different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “There is a contradiction<\/em> in a thing remaining the same and yet constantly changing, being possessed of the antithesis of ‘inertness’ and ‘change’,” Engels wrote. A developing thing has within it the embryo of something else. It contains within itself its own antithesis, a “negating” element which prevents it from remaining inert and immutable. It contains an objective contradiction; opposite tendencies operate within it and a mutual counteraction or “struggle” of opposite forces or sides takes place, leading eventually to the resolution of the contradiction, to a radical, qualitative change of the thing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For many thousands of years the organic species which existed in, say, the so-called Tertiary period of the earth’s geological history remained unchanged and their forms were constant. But this constancy was relative. Changes accumulated in the organisms in the course of interaction with the changing environment. These changes were transmitted hereditarily and led ultimately to the origin of entirely new species of plants and animals. The constant interaction, or “struggle”, within each species between the antithetical tendencies of heredity and variability forms the inner basis of the evolution of the organic world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It follows that the stability of a thing, which presupposes a certain balance or equilibrium of opposites, can only be temporary and relative. Only the motion of matter, which continuously rejects old forms and gives rise to new ones, is eternal and absolute. In formulating this crucial proposition of dialectics, Lenin wrote:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dialectical conception of development as the unity and struggle of opposites is opposed to the metaphysical conception. As Lenin stressed, one of the principle defects of the metaphysical conception of development was that it overlooked the internal motive force of the development of matter, that it ignored self-movement<\/em> and considered the source of development to be external. In the final analysis, God was this external source which imparted motion to matter, but was itself outside matter. The metaphysical conception not only advanced a one-sided, and therefore distorted, notion of development, but led to fideistic conclusions, i.e., the recognition of a divine principle, and, therefore, to the betrayal of science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dialectical conception of development is profound and full of meaning. “It alone furnishes the key to the ‘leaps’, to the ‘break in continuity’, to the ‘transformation into the opposte’, to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.” According to this conception, Lenin wrote, “it is to knowledge of the source of self-<\/em>movement that attention is chiefly directed”. Since it sees in internal contradictoriness of all things and phenomena the key to the comprehension of self-movement and development, the dialectical conception of development does not require any supernatural source of motion. It rejects the intervention of “transcendental” forces in the life of nature, and therefore remains loyal to science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The above description of development as a struggle of opposites is, of course, very general. It is applicable to every process of development and is therefore in itself inadequate for explaining any particular one, because there are no such things as opposites “in general”; opposites<\/em> are always concrete and definite<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Each thing or phenomenon contains innumerable interacting aspects. Moreover, each phenomenon is connected with the things and processes that surround it. This is why diverse external and internal contradictions can be found in all phenomena. In order to understand the development of a phenomenon, one must find out which is the principal, determining contradiction in the given process, what concrete opposites interact within it, what form their “struggle” assumes, and what role in that “struggle” is played by one aspect or another of the contradiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The contradictions inherent in a phenomenon are not immutable and eternal. Like everything else in the world, they arise, develop and are finally resolved, causing a transition from the old qualitative state to a new one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In all cases, when studying the process of development, it is essential to make a concrete analysis of the forms assumed by the struggling opposites and of the stages passed through by the developing contradiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The higher the stage reached by matter in its development\u2014from inorganic nature through the organic world to human society\u2014the more complex and rarified the process of development becomes. In this process the struggle of such opposites as new and old becomes more and more important, and the differentiation and antithesis of the “revolutionary” and “conservative” aspects in the developing phenomenon become progressively sharper. Here too, of course, contradictions are not confined to the struggle of new and old, but in the final count it is this struggle\u2014in the course of which the new overcomes the resistance of the old and asserts itself in life while the old, which has outlived its time, perishes\u2014that determines the character of development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dialectical teaching of development focuses the investigator’s attention on a concrete analysis of the opposing tendencies disclosed in each phenomenon and demands active support for what is new, growing and progressive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In relation to social life, it is important to distinguish between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Contradictions between social groups or classes whose basic interests are irreconcilable are called antagonistic. Such are the contradictions between oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited. In our time this applies above all to the contradictions between the working class and the capitalists. These will not disappear until the capitalist class has been deprived either by peaceful or non-peaceful means of political power and of the means of production, and thereby of the very possibility of exploiting working people. This can only take place through a socialist revolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In politics, in practical activities, it is very important to bear in mind the antagonistic nature of the basic class contradictions in an exploiting society. To deny it leads inevitably to reformist mistakes. Opportunists and revisionists, for example, do not recognise the antagonistic character of the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the working class, and because of this advocate the reconciliation of classes. But such a policy is mistaken and harmful. It weakens the position of the working class and undermines the struggle of the working people for emancipation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Antagonistic contradictions are a historical phenomenon. They are engendered by an exploiting society and exist as long as this society exists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the exploitation of man by man comes to an end, antagonistic contradictions gradually disappear as well. But this does not mean that no contradictions of any kind remain under socialism. “Antagonism and contradiction are by no means the same thing,” Lenin wrote. “Under socialism the first will disappear and the second will remain.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n Non-antagonistic contradictions will remain after the survivals of class distinctions are removed. For contradictions arise in society not only between classes, but also between different aspects of social life, for instance between production and consumption, between different sectors of the economy, between the requirements for development of the productive forces and the existing forms of economic management, etc. That is why there is nothing abnormal about the dialectical contradictions that arise in life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n True, contradictions often involve anxieties and difficulties in life, work and struggle. Much energy has to be devoted to surmounting them. But there is no advance without contradictions, without struggle to resolve them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The principal place among social contradictions is held by the contradictions between the forces that fight for the new and those that defend the old. It is evident that there can be no development without the birth of the new and without its assertion in life, without struggle for the new. The coming into being of some phenomena and the obsolescence of others, contradictions and conflicts between them, and the triumph of the new over the old, are objective, regular features of social development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the struggle to resolve contradictions, people tear down outmoded institutions and relations, overcome inertia and routine and rise to face new, more complex problems and attain more perfect forms of social life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What are the concrete contradictions occurring under socialism? “They are, in the main,” N.S. Khrushchov points out, “contradictions and difficulties connected with the rapid progress of socialist economy, with the growth of the material and cultural requirements of the people, contradictions between the old and the new, between the advanced and the backward.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n The contradictions of socialist society are overcome by the working people under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party through the rapid and continuous development of its material and technical resources and the further development of the economic system, and through improving administrative forms and promoting the socialist consciousness of the working people. The resolution of those contradictions leads to further consolidation of the socialist system and advances of society towards communism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In their efforts to refute materialist dialectics, many opponents of Marxism attack primarily the dialectical theory of contradictions. Most often they maintain that contradictions are always the result of logical inconsistency in thinking and that there cannot be any contradictions in reality itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This “criticism” of the dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites is altogether baseless. In speaking of “contradictions”, materialist dialectics is concerned primarily with the contradictions existing in objective reality. These, of course, must be distinguished from contradictions that arise from inconsistent thinking and confused ideas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Contradictions due to incorrect thinking should not be confused with the objective contradictions existing in objective things. Although the word “contradiction” is the same in both cases, it means different things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The opponents of Marxism resort to yet another method of combating materialist dialectics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the most reactionary trends of idealist philosophy\u2014neo-Hegelianism<\/em>\u2014became widespread in a number of capitalist countries after the First World War and has not lost influence to this day. Its followers distorted Hegel’s idealist dialectics, threw aside everything that was really valuable in it and tried to use it in combating Marxist philosophy for a sophistical justification of anti-scientific and politically reactionary ideas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In particular, some neo-Hegelians began to assert that the nature of life is such that it is inevitably marked by antagonisms, acute conflicts and tragic clashes, and that owing to the “tragic dialectics” of human life people will never be able to surmount the eternal contradictions that afflict society, that they will never be able to build their life on a rational and just foundation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These philosophers declare that the effort of the workers to replace the capitalist system with its contradictions by a socialist system pursues the unrealisable aim of putting an end to the dialectical development of society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By interpreting contradictions in this way these bourgeois philosophers seek to perpetuate capitalism and at the same time to discredit the working-class struggle for communism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Every concrete form of contradictions, including social contradictions, is indeed resolved in the long run. The triumph of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and other countries proves conclusively that the contradictions inherent in capitalism are not eternal, just as capitalism itself is not eternal, and that these contradictions can be overcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The material world exists eternally. But this eternal life of matter is made up of a constant change of its various forms. They come into being, exist and disappear, being replaced by other forms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Stars come into being and perish in the infinite expanse of the universe. Geological epochs succeed one another in the history of the earth. Species of plants and animals come into being and disappear in a countless succession of new-born and dying generations. Forms of social life are not eternal either. They arise, develop, strengthen, and later grow old and are replaced by others. Thus, before our eyes capitalism is being replaced by the socialist system of society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is in the continual birth of new forms, the incessant replacement of obsolete forms by new ones, that the eternal motion and development of matter is manifested.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In elaborating his idealist dialectics, Hegel introduced the concept of “negation”. He asserted that in the logical development of the absolute idea one category “negates” another, although preserving all that was valuable in it. By negation Marxist dialectics understands the law-governed replacement in the process of development of an old quality by a new one, which arises out of the old one. Often this replacement of an old quality by a new one in the process of development takes the form of the transformation of a thing into its opposite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Marx wrote that “no development that does not negate its previous forms of existence can occur in any sphere”. The negation of an old quality by a new one in the process of development is the natural result of the operation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. For a struggle of mutually exclusive aspects and tendencies occurs in each object, phenomenon or process, and this struggle leads ultimately to the “negation” of the old and the appearance of the new. But development does not cease when one phenomenon is “negated” by another that comes to replace it. The new phenomenon that has come into being contains new contradictions. At first these may be unnoticeable but in the course of time they are bound to show themselves. The “struggle of opposites” then begins on a new basis and in the long run leads inevitably to a new “negation”. As a whole, the objective world is eternal and infinite, but all the things that comprise it are limited in space and time, transient and subject to “negation”. No “negation” is the last. Development continues and every successive “negation” is itself, in turn, “negated”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Materialist dialectics does not concern itself with every kind of negation, but with dialectical “negation”, that is, with negation which involves the further development<\/em> of a thing, object, or phenomenon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such “negation” must bed distinguished from mechanical “negation”, in which the object “negated” is destroyed as a result of outside intervention. If we crush an insect or grind a grain of wheat, that will be mechanical “negation”. It may not be purposeless in itself (in this case the destruction of harmful insects and the conversion of wheat into flour), but it terminates the development of the object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Negation in dialectics,” Engels says, “does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dialectical “negation” presupposes not only the destruction of the old, but also the preservation of the viable elements of former stages of development: it presupposes a certain connection between the outgoing old and the new that is coming to replace it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the socialist social system is built upon the ruins of capitalist society, the “negation” of capitalism does not imply complete destruction of everything created by mankind under capitalism. The productive forces and the valuable achievements of science and culture are preserved and continue to develop. Far from being destroyed by the proletarian revolution, everything of value that was created by capitalism serves as a basis for further progress, for the building of socialism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Speaking against people who denied the importance for socialism of the old culture created under the bourgeois system, Lenin said that a new, socialist culture could not be created out of nothing, that “it is not something that has sprung nobody knows whence,” and that is “must be the result of a natural development of the stores of knowledge which mankind has accumulated under the yoke of capitalist society.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nihilism, empty negation, failure to see the successive connection that exists between the new and the old and the need carefully to preserve the positive content acquired in the preceding stages of development, are not only theoretically wrong, but lead to gross errors in practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “It is not negation for the sake of negation, not blank negation, not sceptical<\/em> negation,” Lenin wrote, “that is typical and essential in dialectics, which unquestionably contains an element of negation and, what is more, as its most important element. No, it is negation as a factor of connection, as a factor of development, with a retention of the positive.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Negation” by a new quality of the old quality is a universal law of reality. As to how “negation” occurs concretely, what forms it assumes, and what character, these are extremely diverse and depend on the nature of the object negated, the character of its contradictions, and also on the conditions in which the object develops. Thus, for example, in the development of unicellular organisms which multiply by division into two new organisms, “negation” proceeds differently from negation in the development of multicellular organisms, which die upon giving birth to new organisms. The inorganic world, as well as the history of human society at different stages of its development, also furnish distinct forms of “negation”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since only what has become obsolete is “negated” in the process of development, while all that is sound and viable is preserved, development is a progressive movement, an ascent from lower stages to higher stages, from the simple to the complex. In other words, development is progress<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Often, something like the return to stages previously passed through occurs during this development, when certain features of outlived and replaced forms are repeated, as it were, in the new forms. Engels illustrates with a widely known example. “Let us,” he writes in Anti-Duhring<\/em>, “take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with the conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n True, strains of cereals change slowly and, as a rule, the grain of a new harvest differs but little from the sown seed. However, it is possible to create conditions of development in which change occurs much more rapidly and the result of the “negation of the negation” will differ qualitatively from the point of departure and will, for instance, constitute a new plant variety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Processes in which a return to the old seems to occur maybe observed in the history of society, as well as in the field of cognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, the primitive-communal tribal system, in which there was no exploitation, was replaced in the course of history by an exploiting society (slave, feudal, or capitalist). With the transition to socialism, however, the exploitation of man by man is abolished, and in this respect socialist society resembles primitive communal society. But this resemblance conceals a vast, fundamental difference, conceals the history of the progressive development of society through many thousands of years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, social development did not proceed in a circular course, nor in a straight line, but a spiral<\/em>. It reproduced some features of the past, but it reproduced them at an immeasurably higher level. Lenin described this essential feature of the dialectical conception of development as follows: “A development that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis (‘negation of negation’), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the process of development, deviations from the progressive line can and do happen. There may be zigzags, or regression, and there may be periods of temporary stagnation. Yet history demonstrates that in the long run progressive movement overcomes all these temporary deviations and obstacles, and makes headway. Any natural or social form now in existence has a long history that recedes far into the past and represents the result of a long process of development, of progressive movement from the simple to the complex, of ascent from the lower to the higher.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The solar system materalised out of cosmic dust. Modern plants and animal organisms developed out of initially extremely simple organisms. Society has travelled a long way from the primitive tribe to the contemporary forms of social life. Technology has unceasingly progressed from the original primitive tools to the most complex mechanisms of our time. From the conjectures of the ancient philosophers, which were blended with fantasy, human knowledge has arrived at the present complex and rarified system of the sciences embracing all spheres of reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By tracing this progressive development of nature, society and human thought, materialist dialectics gives people a scientifically-based historical optimism, helping them in their struggle for new, higher forms of life and social organisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By revealing the most general laws of development of nature, society and human thought, materialist dialectics provides us with a scientific method of cognition and of practical transformation of the real world on the basis of this cognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Owing to their universal character, the laws of dialectics are of methodological important and serve as pointers for research\u2014a guide along the road of cognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, if everything in the world takes place according to the laws of dialectics, every phenomenon must be approached from the dialectical standpoint to be understood. Knowing how development occurs enables us to know how developing reality should be studied and what to do to change it. Herein lies the tremendous importance of dialectics for science and the practical remodelling of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Materialist dialectics cannot, of course, take the place of the separate sciences and solve their specific questions and tasks. But every scientific theory is a reflection of the objective world, an elucidation and generalisation of the facts of experience, and presupposes use of general concepts, the art of using which is taught by dialectics. True, even a scientist who knows nothing of dialectics may, by following the logic of the factual material which he studies, arrive at valid conclusions. However, a conscious application of the dialectical method is of invaluable assistance to the scientist and facilitates his task.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The propositions and laws of materialist dialectics are not derived from the data of any single science, but are a generalisation of the entire history of cognition of the world. Knowledge of dialectics enables the scientist, when dealing with the problems of his own science, to stand at the highest level of scientific methodology and the scientific world outlook, and to conduct his concrete research with the aid of the generalised experience of all the sciences, all social practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dialectics sharpens our vision when focussed on the study of facts and the laws of reality. It equips the mind of the scientist, politician, technician, educationalist and artist with insight, and gives them the flexibility and receptiveness in relation to new phenomena that are as necessary to them as the air they breathe. It purges the mind of dogma, prejudice, preconceived notions and false “eternal truths”, which entrammel thought and retard scientific development. It teaches us to keep in touch with life and not to be bogged down in the past, it teaches to perceive the new and always to go forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dialectics expresses the very spirit of scientific research, constant dissatisfaction with the knowledge achieved, and continuous concern and an undying urge for truth, for an increasingly profound cognition of reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dialectics excludes all subjectivism, narrowness and one-sidedness. It develops a broad view of the world and encourages an all-embracing approach to phenomena under study. It calls for an objective, all-round view of things, in their motion and development, in their connections and intermediations, and in their mutual transitions. It teaches the student to see the internal along with the external, to take account not only of the content also the form of a phenomenon, not to stop at a superficial description of phenomena, but to probe farther, deeper, into their substance and yet to bear in mind that the external aspect is also essential and should not be neglected. Dialectics draws attention to the opposite tendencies in each developing phenomenon. It sees what is stable in what is changing, and it discerns the germ of coming changes in what seems to be unshakeable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dialectics, Lenin wrote, is “living<\/em>, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing) with an infinite number of shadings of every sort of approach and approximation to reality.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n The study of dialectics and its application in practice is a powerful educational means. Dialectics develops a distinct pattern of thought and a special style in practice which are hostile to subjectivism, stagnation and dogmatism and are responsive to what is new, growing and progressive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dialectics is the true soul of Marxism. The study of materialist dialectics is of great help not only to the scientist and political leader, but to every one who wants to have a thorough grasp of the developments taking place around him and to participate consciously in social life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Impelled by the very development of science and social life, progressive scientists are increasingly abandoning their prejudice against dialectics and are beginning to understand its tremendous importance for science and life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is by no means easy to apply dialectics correctly to science and practical activities. Dialectics is not a handbook with cut-and-dried answers to questions of science and practice. It is a living flexible guide to action, sensitive to life and its trends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The laws and propositions of dialectics should not be regarded as a pattern into which all facts of reality can be arbitrarily “fitted”. That is a fallacious, scholastic and dogmatic conception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The laws of dialectics are universal. They apply to the development of all things and phenomena. Yet it should be borne in mind that they operate differently in different spheres of the material world, in qualitatively different processes. They manifest themselves in one form in the organic world, and in another in the inorganic world. Their nature in the development of society is different from that in the evolution of the species. They operate in one way in the life of socialist society and differently in the life of capitalist society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In order to apply dialectics in the process of cognition and in practical activities, mastery of the principles of dialectics is not enough; a profound knowledge of concrete facts and circumstances is required. Only after a most careful and thorough study of each concrete situation can it be discovered how and in what form dialectical laws operate in a particular case, how the situation should be appraised, and what the line of action should be if we wish to succeed. That is why dialectics has always to be used creatively<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is made easier by the splendid examples of the use of the method of materialist dialectics to be found in the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, Marx, Engels and Lenin, and in the decisions and activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other Communist and Workers’ Parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the important reasons for the great victories won by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Marxist parties lies in the fact that in their policy, in all their activities, Marxist parties are guided by the method of materialist dialectics and develop that method creatively. Deviation from dialectical materialism, neglect of its laws and propositions, lead in the final count to failures both in theoretical analysis and practical activity. The Declaration of the Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist Countries, held in Moscow, November 14-16, 1957, says rightly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Should the Marxist political party in its examination of questions base itself not on dialectics and materialism, the result will be one-sidedness and subjectivism, stagnation of human thought, isolation from life and loss of ability to make the necessary analysis of things and phenomena, revisionist and dogmatist mistakes and mistakes in policy.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dialectics is not only a method of studying reality. It is a method of revolutionary change of reality. It emphasises the importance of an active, effective approach to the world that surrounds us. It is in practice\u2014in work, labour, the class struggle and the building of communism\u2014that the propositions, the laws of materialist dialectics, are tested. Practice yields a wealth of material for the further development of dialectics, for the further elucidation of its propositions, for a fuller and deeper study of its laws. This is why the creative application of Marxist dialectics consists, first and foremost, in its use as an instrument of practical activity, a means of transforming life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n1. The Universal Connection of Phenomena<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Connection of Cause and Effect<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Against the Idealist Conception of Causality<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Interaction<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Necessity and Law<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Necessity and Accident<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Determinism and Modern Science<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
2. Quantitative and Qualitative Change in Nature and Society<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Qualitative and Quantitative Definitions of Things<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Quantitative Changes Turn into Qualitative Ones<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
What Is a Leap?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Against the Metaphysical Notion of Development<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
3. Division into Opposites Is the Chief Source of Development<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
A Note on the History of Dialectics<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Dialectical Contradiction and Its Universal Character<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Development as the Struggle of Opposites<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Contradiction Is Always Concrete<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Antagonistic and Non-Antagonistic Contradictions<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Bourgeois Ideologists Distort Dialectics<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
4. Dialectical Development from the Lower to the Higher<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Dialectical Negation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Continuity in Development<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
The Progressive Nature of Development<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
5. Dialectics as a Method of Cognition and Transformation of the World<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Importance of Dialectics for Science and Practice<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
The Creative Application of Dialectics<\/h4>\n\n\n\n